TARGET2 Unlimited: Monetary Policy Implications of Asymmetric Liquidity Management within the Euro Area by Abad, José M et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
TARGET2 Unlimited: Monetary Policy
Implications of Asymmetric Liquidity
Management within the Euro Area
Jose´ M Abad and Axel Loeﬄer and Holger Zemanek
Universita¨t Leipzig
2. July 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/31937/
MPRA Paper No. 31937, posted 3. July 2011 13:49 UTC
  
TARGET2 Unlimited: Monetary Policy Implications of Asymmetric Liquidity 
Management within the Euro Area 
 
Abad, Jose 
University of Leipzig 
Institute for Economic Policy 
Grimmaische Str. 12 
D-04109 Leipzig/Germany 
(abad@wifa.uni-leipzig.de) 
Löffler, Axel 
University of Leipzig 
Institute for Economic Policy 
Grimmaische Str. 12 
D-04109 Leipzig/Germany 
(loeffler@wifa.uni-leipzig.de) 
 
Zemanek, Holger 
University of Leipzig 
Institute for Economic Policy 
Grimmaische Str. 12  
D-04109 Leipzig/Germany 
(zemanek@wifa.uni-leipzig.de) 
 
01.07.2011 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the implications of a continued divergence of TARGET2 balances for 
monetary policy in the euro area. The accumulation of TARGET2 claims (liabilities) would 
make ECB’s liquidity management asymmetric once the TARGET2 claims in core countries 
have crowded out central bank credit in those regions. Then while providing scarce liquidity to 
banks in countries with TARGET2 liabilities, the ECB will need to absorb excess liquidity in 
countries with TARGET2 claims. We discuss three alternatives and its implications to absorb 
excess liquidity in core regions: (1) Using market based measures might accelerate the capital 
flight from periphery to core countries and would add to the accumulation of risky assets by the 
ECB. (2) Conducting non-market based measures such as imposing differential (unremunerated) 
reserve requirements would distort banking markets and would support the development of 
shadow banking. (3) Staying passive would lead to decreasing interest rates in core Europe 
entailing inflationary pressure and overinvestment in those regions and possibly future instability 
of the banking system.  
 
 
 
 
JEL: E42, E52, E58, F32, F36 
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1. Introduction 
 
A paper by Sinn (2011b) on the stealthily financing of euro area current account deficits by the 
ECB has opened up a controversial debate on the offspring, development and broader 
implications of TARGET2 (im-)balances1. Individual TARGET2 positions, which are recorded 
in the balance sheets of Eurosystem’s national central banks, began to diverge with the outbreak 
of the financial crisis back in 2007. Until today, the Deutsche Bundesbank (BB) has accumulated 
claims (against the GIPS’s central banks2) of more than 300 billion euros.  
 
Sinn (2011a and 2011b) argues that such imbalances are the reflection of an interim and secret 
bailout by the ECB of the countries grouped under the ‘GIPS’ acronym. By increasing BB’s 
claims over time, GIPS’s (Greece’s in particular) net imports are being supported and intra-Euro 
current account imbalances are being perpetuated (current account view). However, as Buiter et 
al. (2011) and Bindseil and Koenig (2011) note, TARGET2 imbalances are just the result of 
capital movements between each pair of countries settled through the Eurosystem’s payment 
clearing system (financial account view). The policy relevance gained by the TARGET2 
mechanism stems from the disruption and prolonged malfunctioning of interbank funding 
markets in Europe.  
 
Since the financial crisis started, a number of national banking systems (Irish, Greek and 
Portuguese banks in particular) have been progressively excluded from the interbank lending 
markets over growing concerns about their solvency. The Eurosystem had to step in as a market-
maker, providing unlimited lending to GIPS’s banks. TARGET2 (im-)balances began reflecting 
GIPS’s net capital outflows as refinanced by the Eurosystem. Note that only the Irish banking 
system has lost about 140 billion euro of foreign deposits since 2007, with German banks 
becoming the main beneficiaries of capital-repatriating flows currently underway. Furthermore, 
TARGET2 balances will keep diverging for as long as foreign (and even domestic) bank 
deposits in crisis countries are transferred to other banking systems which are perceived as safer 
by depositors. 
 
In this context, Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) argue that the total stock of central bank money 
poses a hard limit to TARGET2 (im)balances. However, we show that –far from being any hard 
limit- TARGET2 balances might be unlimited. That said, further extensions of TARGET2 
                                                 
1 TARGET2 is Eurosystem’s real-time gross payment (and securities) settlement system. The ‘Eurosystem’ 
comprises the ECB and the Eurozone’s national central banks. 
2 ‘GIPS’ stands for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
claims (liabilities) in the euro area’s core (peripheral) economies might be at odds with 
maintaining a common monetary policy within the currency union.  
 
Increasing BB’s TARGET2 claims above autonomous liquidity demand3 would lead to excess 
liquidity in Germany (as well as in other TARGET2-creditor countries), which  –as we will see – 
would pose a threat to the “common” nature of monetary policy in the euro area. Note that, in 
order to maintain a single interest rate for the whole union, the ECB needs to provide liquidity to 
banks in the GIPS countries (TARGET2 debtors) while simultaneously absorbing excess 
liquidity from the Eurozone’s core countries (TARGET2 creditors). In this paper, we look at the 
different alternatives for liquidity management within the euro area and show that policy-making 
might become quite uncomfortable for European central bankers.  
 
2. The ECB as a Market-Maker of Last Resort. Or How TARGET2 is 
Financing Intra-Euro Area Capital Flights. 
 
In order to draw a stylized picture of how TARGET2 is supporting capital flights we assume the 
euro area as a currency union consisting of two countries -Germany and Ireland. Before the 
crisis, the German banking system massively accumulated foreign claims –in our 2 country 
world– against Irish banks, therefore playing an active role in the build-up of the Irish boom. 
However, the financial crisis brought the boom to a sudden end. German investors’ risk-aversion 
(against Irish assets) increased and German financial institutions started to repatriate their 
investments. Funds started to leave Ireland and to flow back into Germany. Figure 1 shows the 
balance sheets of the Irish and the German banking systems. Until the crisis, the increase of the 
Irish banking system’s balance sheet was mainly driven by foreign deposits which were used to 
finance investments both inside and outside Ireland. With the outbreak of the 2007/2008 
financial crisis, this funding source started to decline, specially in the second half of last year 
(see upper panel of Figure 1). In Germany this development was mirrored (in absolute terms) by 
a rise of foreign claims before the crisis and its reversal after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
(see lower panel of Figure 1).   
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Autonomous liquidity demand is equivalent to the sum of autonomous liquidity absorbing factors on the liability 
side of the central banks balance sheet. This –in case of the BB - is mainly explained by currency in circulation. See 
ECB (2011), p.115. 
Figure 1: Banking System Balance Sheets 
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Source: National Central Banks, IMF: IFS. 
 
In a world without a lender of last resort, the ‘bank run’ on Irish banks triggered by the flight of 
foreign (German) deposits would have ended up in the collapse of the Irish banking system 
while, in Germany, banks would have realized massive losses as the capital flight would have 
been limited by the sequential-service constraint4. Not so within the Eurosystem: Since the start 
of the financial crisis, Irish banks have been progressively excluded from interbank lending as 
German banks reduced their exposure to them on the back of concerns over their solvency. The 
ECB had to act as a ‘market-maker of last resort’ in order to avoid a potential systemic event. 
The TARGET2 system guaranteed Irish banks unlimited5 credit lines from other Eurosystem 
central banks at the ECB’s refinancing rate, eliminating the sequential-service constraint for 
German banks. 
 
Figure 2: Financing of Intra-Euro Area Capital Flight via the TARGET2 
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4 Due to term transformation only the first-movers would have saved their deposits. That was the case of Iceland, 
where, as capital left the country, many ‘slow’ foreign investors based in the UK and the Netherlands lost theirs.   
5 Providing Irish banks provided sufficient collateral.  
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Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the TARGET2 mechanism and the flight of German capital out 
of Ireland (flowing back into Germany).6 Firstly, German banks reduce their exposure to Ireland. 
Foreign claims (item 1) of the German banking sector are declining, mirroring a reduction of 
foreign liabilities in the Irish banking sector’s balance sheet (item 2). While also reducing their 
domestic and foreign claims, Irish banks fill the gap left by the reduction in (foreign) financing 
sources by (over-)relying on central bank credit (item 3). As a result, open market operations 
increase (item 4) in the asset side of the Bank of Ireland’s (BOI) balance sheet, and a similar 
increase in TARGET2 liabilities (item 5) follow. As the ECB intermediates the transfer of bank 
deposits -via TARGET2- to the BB, ECB’s TARGET2 liabilities to BB increase (item 7).7 In its 
turn, BB books TARGET2 outflows among its assets (item 8) and credits the proceeds on the 
account of the recipient German bank (item 9). The German banking system, whose claims on 
the central bank have increased (item 10) now holds liquidity in excess of their reserve 
requirements. In order to minimize low-remunerated ‘excess’ liquidity (item 10), German banks 
reduce their reliance over refinancing operations at the BB (item 11), which is equivalent to 
declining claims of BB on German banks (item 12) and a reduction of liquidity (item 9).  
 
The stylized chart of liquidity flows described in Figure 2 shows up in the balance sheets of both 
the BOI and BB (Figure 3). Since the start of the crisis, claims on Irish banks (as well as 
TARGET2 liabilities in the BOI balance sheet) have sharply increased. This increase has been 
mirrored by an increase of TARGET2 claims (substituting previous claims on German banks) in 
the BB’s balance sheet.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 A broadly similar approach is described in Buiter et al. (2011) and Bindseil and Koenig (2011). 
7 There is no ‘world’ liquidity effect as TARGET2 claims and liabilities sum up to zero at the ECB level.  
Figure 3: Central Bank Balance Sheets 
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3. Unlimited TARGET2 Balances – The Emergence of Creditor and Debtor 
Central Banks 
 
According to Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011), the resulting increase in TARGET2 liabilities 
(claims) at the BOI (BB) would crowd central bank credit out in Germany (see item 8 and 12 in 
Figure 2 and the horizontal dashed area substituting the black area in the lower panel of Figure 
3). While this situation might be possible, the implications that Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) 
derive are not straightforward. They argue that the Eurosystem would need to sell its (gold and 
foreign exchange) reserves when the supply of liquidity due to the accumulation of TARGET2 
claims exceeding autonomous liquidity demand. While theoretically possible, it is not very 
likely. Instead, the BB would (be inclined to) absorb liquidity by issuing debt instruments which 
would be recorded on its balance sheet’s liability side. 
 
However, this –in our view- more realistic scenario would lead to a paradoxical situation. In 
general, a textbook central bank holds a monopoly over the issuance of base money and provides 
liquidity wherever it is scarce at the policy rate (creditor central bank). In contrast, due to the 
accumulation of large stocks of foreign reserves, most emerging market central banks are facing 
surplus liquidity in their domestic banking systems (debtor central bank). By expanding longer-
term liabilities to the domestic banking system, debtor central banks structurally absorb liquidity 
(Loeffler et al. 2010).  
 
The increase of TARGET2 claims above liquidity demand at the BB would have a similar effect 
to the accumulation of FX reserves in emerging-market central banks. In fact, the BB would 
become a debtor central bank towards the German banking system! At the same time, national 
central banks building up TARGET2 liabilities -such as the BOI- would remain as classical 
creditor central banks. That is, while the ECB would need to provide liquidity to one region of 
the euro area, it would also have to reduce liquidity in countries with TARGET2 claims. As a 
result, liquidity management in the euro area would become asymmetric.  
 
To get a sense of how the balance sheets of creditor (BOI) and debtor central bank (BB) would 
differ, Figure 4 zooms into Figure 2 for that purpose. With constant liquidity demand in 
Germany, the continued increase of TARGET2 claims would lead to an oversupply of liquidity. 
In order to absorb the excess liquidity, BB would have to offer debt instruments to German 
banks (item 13). In contrast, the BOI would have to expand its open market operations on the 
asset side of its balance sheet in order to meet the increasing liquidity needs of the Irish banking 
system.   
 
Figure 4: The Emergence of Creditor and Debtor Central Banks 
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4. Liquidity Management in an Asymmetric Monetary Union 
 
In light of these developments, the ECB will face three major alternatives for managing the 
excess liquidity we have already analyzed in our stylized 2-country monetary union. Firstly, the 
Eurosystem could conduct market-based measures such as selling bonds to German banks or 
using reverse repos to drain excess liquidity in the German banking system. Secondly, it could 
absorb excess liquidity through non-market based instruments such as to increase 
(unremunerated) minimum reserve requirements. Thirdly, the Eurosystem could (do nothing 
and) just offer German banks access to the ECB’s deposit facility which is remunerated at 0.5%, 
that is,  75 basis points below the marginal lending rate (currently at 1.25%).8 
 
(1) Market-based Liquidity Drain  
 
In order to encourage German banks investing in longer-term central bank debt, the Eurosystem 
could offer reverse repos at an interest rate close to the main refinancing rate. If excess liquidity 
is completely absorbed, this option would ensure a common monetary policy within the 
Eurozone as short-term rates would remain close to one another in all member countries. 
However, two main unintended consequences are likely to follow. Firstly, capital flight would 
likely accelerate as the TARGET2 mechanism would provides an incentive for German banks to 
withdraw their foreign deposits from Irish financial institutions and invest them into high yield 
central bank debt. The implications would be that German banks would be encouraged to even 
                                                 
8 There is a fourth alternative which is ‘fiscal coordination’. Fiscal authorities might move bank deposits to the 
central bank. In this case, government deposits would become quasi-monetary policy operations for as long as the 
central bank is able to keep withdrawals under control. The mixture of fiscal debt management and monetary policy 
would call into question the ‘independence’ of the central bank at stake. 
accelerate their disengagement in Ireland as the Eurosystem – due to the TARGET2 mechanism 
- would de-facto swap the risky exposure of German banks toward the Irish BS into riskless high 
yielding claims against their central bank. Secondly, issuing debt certificates at the policy rate 
could complicate liquidity management and discourage interbank lending as banks could 
overdemand liquidity knowing that, at the end of the day, they could reinvest it in market-based 
central bank debt at the policy rate.9     
 
Figure 5 describes this mechanism. ‘Private liquidity’ flows via the TARGET2 system back to 
Germany leading to an increased demand on ‘central bank liquidity’ by Irish banks, which have 
to pay the policy rate for their increased reliance over Eurosystem lending. German banks are 
encouraged to remove their deposits as they can invest their repatriated deposits with the 
Eurosystem yielding at least the policy rate.  
 
Figure 5: Free Lunch for German Banks 
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While claims against the Eurosystem (reverse repos) are riskless10, funds deposited at Irish banks 
are (perceived as) much riskier11. The Eurosystem as a whole would be accumulating riskier 
assets as a by-product of its monetary policy operations with the Irish banks (lower part of 
Figure 5). The default risk of holding such riskier assets posted as collateral by Irish banks would 
be born by the ECB and, ultimately, by the individual national central banks in accordance to 
                                                 
9 Under ‘normal’ conditions overdemanding liquidity is not ‘costless’ as lending the excess liquidity in the interbank 
market would lead to a downward pressure on interbank rates while reinvesting it in central bank debt would be 
possible only at the deposit interest rate. 
10 In order to ensure the attractiveness of those investments the default risk would have to remain at the ECB. 
11 Note that, while it could be argued that ‘deposit insurance’ makes deposits risk-free, this depends –in its turn- on 
the Government’s creditworthiness. Once this is lost, concerns over the higher risk of funds deposited at domestic 
institutions would be justified. 
their capital key. Overall, this first option would represent a ‘free lunch’ for the German banking 
sector. 
 
 (2) Non-market Based Liquidity Drain  
 
In order to absorb excess liquidity in the German banking system, the Eurosystem could also 
impose differential unremunerated required reserves (DeGrauwe 2010). In contrast to market 
based measures in which banks are free to invest on its own initiative, minimum reserve 
requirements are imposed by legal force. An increase of binding unremunerated12 required 
reserves on German Banks would force them to increase their deposits at the Eurosystem.13 BB’s 
longer-term liabilities to the German BS (item 13 in Figure 4) would increase and –therefore- the 
(over)supply of liquidity would fall.  
 
The very serious drawbacks of absorbing liquidity by legal force are at least twofold: (1) Mixing 
up interest rate policies with quantity restrictions would probably induce higher interest rate 
volatility as monetary policy can only choose between two instruments: Either targeting prices 
(interest rates) and leaving quantities react endogenously or targeting quantities and accepting an 
endogenous determination of prices. Therefore, minimum reserve requirements would not be 
able to absorb peaks of excess liquidity without causing extreme interest rate swings in the 
interbank market.14 (2) As reserve requirements are not mandatory for all financial institutions, 
but just to depository banks, the quasi-tax nature would hinder fair competition. In this case, 
monetary policy would support the emergence of unregulated financial products and institutions. 
 
(3) Deposit facility – No Active Liquidity Drain 
 
This option -in our view, the most likely one- would be equivalent to a decrease of the money 
market interest rate in Germany. Since Irish banks are virtually excluded from the Euro interbank 
lending market, excess liquidity in the German banking system would lead -due to the lack of 
alternative investment opportunities with a better risk-return profile- to additional pressure on 
                                                 
12 Currently, minimum reserves in the Eurosystem are remunerated by the average interest rate of ECB’s main 
refinancing operations during a month. Therefore, although banks are not free to invest in required reserves, an 
increase of remunerated reserve requirements would have a similar impact as that of using market based measures to 
absorb surplus liquidity.  
13 In practice, minimum reserve requirements would need to be increased in all euro area countries which are 
interconnected with the German banking system through the interbank market. 
14 Managing liquidity through reserve requirement adjustments has sometimes been compared to cutting a diamond 
with a sledgehammer. The ECB required reserve ratio is 2 percent of overnight deposits as well as deposits and debt 
securities with a maturity up to 2 years and has not changed since the beginning of EMU. 
short-term interest rates. Interbank interest rates would fall to the Eurosystem’s overnight deposit 
rate15, currently 75 basis points below the main financing rate (Figure 6). At this rate, banks 
would be indifferent between investing their excess of liquidity with other commercial banks and 
rather investing it at the Eurosystem’s riskless deposit facility. Thus, building on the deposit 
facility, the effective money market rate would be higher in crisis countries -like Ireland- than in 
the boom ones –like Germany.  
 
Apart from not being in line with a common monetary policy, the ‘do nothing’ option would 
foster overinvestment in Germany. In order to avoid investing the ‘free’ liquidity into the low-
yielding deposit facility, German banks would have the incentives to search for higher-yielding 
investment projects. Inflationary pressures, together with the usual hazards associated with 
excessive and/or riskier lending in Germany, would be two likely outcomes. However, there is 
also a point in favor for the deposit facility solution. The lack of investment opportunities could 
also discourage German banks from removing their foreign deposits16. That would lower the 
pressure on the TARGET2 mechanism as well as on monetary policy. 
 
Figure 6: Euro Area Policy Rates 
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Source: ECB. 
 
 
                                                 
15 The overnight deposit rate is the relevant policy rate in an environment of excess liquidity.  
16 Which would also be the case when absorbing excess liquidity non-market based. 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper has looked at the implications of an ongoing divergence of TARGET2 balances for 
monetary policy in the euro area in the case of a prolonged capital flight from the periphery to 
core countries. We show that the “common” nature of monetary policy within the Eurozone 
could be called into question if TARGET2 claims lead to rising liquidity in the core regions. 
Should that be the case, the Eurosystem would need to provide liquidity to banks in countries 
with TARGET2 liabilities while absorbing excess liquidity in countries with TARGET2 claims 
to maintain a common interest rate for the euro area.  
 
The strategies available at hand for absorbing excess liquidity are limited and neither of their 
outcomes will be optimal from the Eurosystem’s perspective. Using liquidity-absorbing market-
based measures might even accelerate the capital repatriation process and would provide core 
banks with a ‘free lunch’. Imposing unremunerated reserve requirements on core banks might 
hamper (or even break) the interest-rate transmission channel and encourage the emergence of 
shadow banking. Finally, even a ‘do nothing’ scenario would likely cause inflationary pressures, 
together with the hazards associated with excessive and/or riskier lending in core countries.  
 
Whether a credit-driven boom in core Europe’s domestic economies would provide a 'way out' of 
the current crisis remains uncertain. By driving an overinvestment cycle in core Europe (in 
particular in Germany), GDP growth and asset prices would pick-up. Domestic demand would 
start rising possibly with positive spillover effects to periphery countries. The boom would 
improve the asset side of German banks’ balance sheets so their restructuring would also be 
quicker. A likely increase of liquidity demand by German banks could lead to a reduction of 
excess liquidity, although it could also accelerate the deposit drain to fund investments in 
Germany. Overall, relying on a bubble for boosting short-term growth would be sowing the 
seeds of the next crisis. 
 
The best scenario we conceive is one in which TARGET2 balances do not unlimitedly diverge. 
However, to reach that goal, the euro area interbank money market would need to be fully 
restored so as to improve the liquidity allocation process. Since this cannot be safely achieved by 
the usual stabilisation policies at hand, we urge policymakers at speeding up the restructuring 
process currently underway in many European banking sectors and to meet the fiscal 
consolidation targets in place to regain the trust of financial markets.   
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